“Papers of School of Philosophy”
The Norms of Belief as the Norms of Commitment: A Case for Pluralism,
The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2023), [abstract]
DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12507
2. A. Hossein Khani,
Quine and First-Person Authority,
Logos & Episteme 14(2023), 141-161 [abstract]
DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202314211
3. A. Hossein Khani,
Intention, Judgement-Dependence and Self-Deception,
Res Philosophica 100(2023), 203-226 [abstract]
DOI: 10.11612/resphil.2259
4. H. Vahid,
Faith: Intention to Form Theistic Beliefs,
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 93(2023), 39-50 [abstract]
DOI: 10.1007/s11153-022-09851-0
5. M. Zamani,
The Disjunction Thesis and Necessary Connection,
Analytic Philosophy 64(2023), 318-328 [abstract]
DOI: 10.1111/phib.12265
6. A. Hossein Khani,
The Root of the Third Dogma of Empiricism: Davidson vs. Quine on Factualism,
Acta Analytica 38(2023), 161-183 [abstract]
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00509-0
7. A. Kazemi,
Transparency and the truth norm of belief,
Synthese 200(2022), 1-18 [abstract]
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-022-03724-9
8. H. Vahid,
No Practical Reasons for Belief: The Epistemic Significance of Practical Considerations,
Synthese 200(2022), 1-18 [abstract]
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-022-03474-8
9. M. Morvarid,
Mereology is not a Guide to (In)conceivability: A Reply to Giberman,
Dialectica 999(2022), [abstract]
DOI: 10.48106/dial.v74.i3.07
10. A. Hossein Khani,
Davidson on Pure Intending: A Non-Reductionist Judgement-Dependent Account,
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 61(2022), 369-391 [abstract]
DOI: 10.1017/S0012217321000214
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