“School of Philosophy”

Back to Papers Home
Back to Papers of School of Philosophy

Paper   IPM / Philosophy / 8090
School of Analytic Philosophy
  Title:   Doubts about Epistemic Supervenience
  Author(s):  H. Vahid
  Status:   Published
  Journal: JPR
  Vol.:  29
  Year:  2004
  Pages:   153-172
  Supported by:  IPM
It has often been maintained that epistemic properties supervene on non-epistemic properties. Thus, a belief?s being justified is thought to supervene on such non-epistemic properties as indubitability, coherence, being appropriately caused by experience, etc. The idea of epistemic supervenience has also been invoked to resolve a number of epistemological disputes such as the possibility of normative epistemology, the problem of non-doxastic justification and so on. In this paper, I will try to show that none of the arguments adduced in support of the supervenience thesis are valid. After highlighting a number of problems that are independently raised for the thesis, I question its alleged potentials in resolving epistemological controversies. I shall also argue that those particular theories of justification that are committed to a (strong) version of the supervenience thesis are bound to give up normative epistemology, thus, rendering the notion of epistemic supervenience even more suspect.

Download TeX format
back to top
scroll left or right