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Paper   IPM / Philosophy / 17749
School of Analytic Philosophy
  Title:   The perceptual model: Emotions as possessed reasons
  Author(s):  Hamid Vahid
  Status:   Forthcoming
  Journal: Ratio
  Year:  2025
  Supported by:  IPM
Emotions play vital roles in our psychology and our lives. They also often form the basis of our evaluative beliefs. On some views, emotions, like perceptions, justify the beliefs to which they give rise. It has, however, been claimed that, unlike perceptions, emotions are merely proxies for the genuine reasons that are constituted by their cognitive bases. In this paper, I argue that this objection arises from the failure to notice the difference between the notions of 'reasons there are' and 'possessed reasons'. After developing an account of what it is to possess a reason, it will be argued that emotions do constitute genuine reasons for the evaluative beliefs that result from them. To support this claim, a distinction is made between thinner and thicker descriptions of the same event, where a thinner description may be in terms of the emotional response, whereas a thicker description may be in terms of possessing a normative reason to hold a belief or to act.

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