“School of Philosophy”

Back to Papers Home
Back to Papers of School of Philosophy

Paper   IPM / Philosophy / 17249
School of Analytic Philosophy
  Title:   Intention and Judgment-Dependence: First-Personal vs. Third-Personal Accounts
  Author(s):  Ali Hossein Khani
  Status:   To Appear
  Journal: Philosophical Explorations
  Supported by:  IPM
A Third-Person-Based Judgment-Dependent account of mental content implies that, as an a priori matter, facts about a subject's mental content are precisely captured by the judgments of a second-person or an interpreter. Byrne, Child, and others have attributed such a view to Davidson. This account significantly departs from a First-Person-Based Judgment-Dependent account, such as Wright's, according to which, as an a priori matter, facts about intentional content are constituted by the judgments of the subject herself, formed under certain optimal conditions. I will argue for two claims: (1) Attributing a Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account to Davidson is unjustified; Davidson's view is much closer to a First-Personal account. (2) The Third-Personal accounts rest on a misconstrual of the role of an interpreter in the First-Personal accounts.

Download TeX format
back to top
scroll left or right