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Paper   IPM / Philosophy / 16060
School of Analytic Philosophy
  Title:   Interpretationism and Judgement-Dependence
  Author(s):  Ali Hossein Khani
  Status:   Published
  Journal: Synthese
  Vol.:  198
  Year:  2021
  Pages:   9639-9659
  Supported by:  IPM
According to Wright's Judgement-Dependent account of intention, facts about a subject's intentions can be taken to be constituted by facts about the subject's best opinions about them formed under certain optimal conditions. This paper aims to defend this account against three main objections which have been made to it by Boghossian, Miller and implicitly by Wright himself. It will be argued that Miller's objection is implausible because it fails to take into account the partial-determination claim in this account. Boghossian's objection also fails because it is based on an unjustified reductionist reading of Wright's account. However, Wright's own attempt to resist Boghossian's objection seems to display a shift from his Judgement-Dependent account to an Interpretationist account of self-knowledge, in which case Wright's new account would face the same problem which he himself has previously put forward in the case of Davidson's Interpretationist account of self-knowledge. Nonetheless, I will argue that Wright does not need to make such a move because Boghossian's objection is not applicable to his account.

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