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|Paper IPM / Philosophy / 15565||
Recently, a number of experimental philosophers have converged on the position that the ordinary concept of weakness of will does not solely consist in "judgment" or ïntention" violation but is more like a cluster concept in which each factor plays contributory roles in the application of the concept. This, however, raises the question as to which factor is more central or plays a more significant role in folk's understanding of the concept. I contend that the ordinary concept of weakness of will is primarily constituted by the ëxecutive commitment" rather than the ëvaluative commitment" practices. Drawing on extensive evidence from developmental psychology, I will argue that the executive commitment, which, as I will show, involve intention recognition and metarepresentation, is developmentally prior and more fundamental in our exercise and intuitive understanding of the concept.
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