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Paper   IPM / Philosophy / 15359
School of Analytic Philosophy
  Title:   Davidson's Antirealism?
1.  Ali Hossein Khani
2.  A Miller
  Status:   Published
  Journal: Revista de Filosofia Aurora
  No.:  40
  Vol.:  27
  Year:  2015
  Pages:   265-276
  Supported by:  IPM
Frederic Stoutland (1982a, 1982b) has argued that a Davidsonian theory of meaning is incompatible with a realist view of truth, on which the truth-conditions of sentences consist of mind-independent states of affairs or concatenations of extra-linguistic objects. In this paper we show that Stoutland's argument is a failure.

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