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Paper   IPM / Philosophy / 14679
School of Analytic Philosophy
  Title:   Self-knowledge and the Guise of the Good
  Author(s):  Amir Saemi
  Status:   Published
  Journal: Analytic Philosophy
  No.:  3
  Vol.:  58
  Year:  2017
  Pages:   272-281
  Supported by:  IPM
According to the Doctrine of the Guise of the Good, actions are taken to be good by their agents. Kieran Setiya, however, has formulated a new objection to the DGG based on the distinction between the notions of normative reasons and motivating reasons. Only the latter, Setiya claims, is required for intentional agency. However, I will argue that Setiya's objection fails because it rests on the implausible assumption that motivating reasons are determined solely in terms of the content of the belief involved in answering the "why" question. But the basis, or origin, of a belief is crucially important in determining whether the content of a belief can constitute a motivating reason for action. However, I will argue that the failure of Setiya's argument reveals an important but neglected facts about the DGG, namely, that it presupposes the view that beliefs (or our dispositions to judge) about normative reasons play a role in one's knowledge of what one is doing when one acts for a reason. Moreover, my discussion will make it clear that the DGG has a better chance of being true if it is formulated in terms of disposition to judge, rather than belief.

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