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Paper   IPM / Philosophy / 13115
School of Analytic Philosophy
  Title:   The Dogmatism Paradox and the Problem of Misleading Evidence
  Author(s):  Hamid Vahid
  Status:   Published
  Journal: Teorema
  No.:  1
  Vol.:  31
  Year:  2012
  Pages:   47-57
  Supported by:  IPM
It seems uncontroversial that if one knows (is justified in believing) that p, one knows (is justified in believing) that any contrary evidence to p will be misleading. But this has a paradoxical consequence, as it would seem to allow us to ignore any contrary evidence should one actually encounter it. In this paper, after criticizing a number of solutions of the puzzle, I offer my own proposal which involves a reappraisal of the notion of misleading evidence.

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