“School of Mathematics”
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| Paper IPM / M / 191 |
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| Abstract: | |
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In her recent discussion of the problem of
the empirical basis, Susan Haack sets out to show that the solutions offered by the Popperian school are all inadequate. Her objectives, however, go well beyond the mere refutation of such claims. She also tries to explicate the contribution of experience to the justification of one's belief, thus adjudicating between foundationalism and coherentism. She puts forward what she calls a `foundherentist' account of the structure of justification which, she claims, retains the virtues of both foundationalism and
coherentism while avoiding their vices. In this article I shall try to show that, in addition to failing to explicate the justificatory role of experience, her proposal is actually a version of coherentism and that a coherentist need not find her account of the contribution of
experience to justification particularly objectionable.
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