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|Paper IPM / M / 16019||
On the basis of the normativity of belief thesis in epistemology, belief is a normative mental state. There are various versions of the thesis in the literature, which two of the most well-known versions will be considered in this paper. The first version concerns the so-called ï¿½??truth normï¿½?ï¿½ holds that ï¿½??one ought to believe that p iff p is trueï¿½?ï¿½ (Shah 2003, 2009). On the basis of the other one, known as ï¿½??knowledge normï¿½?ï¿½, ï¿½??one ought to believe that p iff one knows that pï¿½?ï¿½ (Williamson 2000, Brown 2010). A complete consideration of the theses is typically extraneous to the purpose of this short paper. Our focus in this paper concerns Shackelï¿½??s criticisms, according to which, there are self-referral sentences which render the norms into contradiction. In this paper we will consider and defuse the criticisms.
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